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TORTS-DEFAMATION-PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE WILL BE USED
EXPANSIVELY TO PROTECT MEDIA
Marcone v. Penthouse International (1985)
In 1964, with the landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,1 the law of defamation for the first time became subject to federal
constitutional limitations under the first amendment, 2 leaving forever
the comfortable confines of the common law.3 Over time, the Court
refined the meaning and expanded the scope of these limitations, 4
which find their present day expression in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.5
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 283. Recognizing the important first amendment considerations
involved in a modern defamation action against the media, the Court sought to
extend maximum protection to the first amendment interests of free speech and
press, without completely sacrificing the plaintiff's interest in reputation. Id. at
279. In order to achieve this goal, the Court held that a "public official" may not
recover in a libel action against a media defendant "unless he proves that the
[defamatory] statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at
280-81; see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (equating
reckless disregard with subjective awareness of probable falsity).
3. 376 U.S. at 269. Prior to New York Times, the law of defamation was
strictly a matter of state law. Id. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 113 at
804-12 (5th ed. 1984). Following New York Times, the states were required to
conform their common law of defamation to the limitations imposed by the first
amendment, making a modern defamation action a combination of both state
law and federal constitutional law. Id.
4. In the years following New York Times, the Court has extended first
amendment protection under the actual malice standard to cover defamatory
statements concerning "public figures." See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion). The Court has been unable, however, to
agree on the proper constitutional standard or definition of "public figures." Id.
at 154-55 (plurality opinion), 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring); see also Harris v.
Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687, 698 (E.D. Ca. 1982) (noting the difficulty of using defi-
nitions in the law). After Butts, the Court further extended the actual malice
standard to all defamatory statements concerning matters of "general or public
interest," regardless of the plaintiff's status. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (plurality opinion).
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, the Supreme Court endeavored to strike
an appropriate balance between the competing interests involved in a libel ac-
tion against a media defendant. The Court expressed fear that the Rosenbloom
standard would force "state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis ...
what information is relevant to self government." Id. at 346 (quoting Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
Accordingly, the Court declared that, henceforth, the level of strategic constitu-
tional protection afforded to defamatory falsehoods would depend upon the sta-
tus of the plaintiff. Id. at 342-48. Regarding "private plaintiffs," the states
would retain the freedom to define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability, save strict liability. Id. However, presumed or punitive damages would
be based upon a finding of "actual malice." Id. at 349-50. If a state imposed
(1245)
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Although several United States Supreme Court cases have since refined
the meaning of Gertz, 6 many difficult issues remain. 7 In Marcone v. Pent-
house Int'l,8 the Third Circuit confronted two such issues: 1) whether the
plaintiff should be classified as a public figure, and if so, 2) whether he
had proven actual malice. 9 These inquiries were not novel for the Third
liability on less than a showing of actual malice, then recovery would be limited
to compensation for "actual injury." Id. Public figures, on the other hand, were
required to prove actual malice in order to recover any damages in a libel action
against a media defendant. Id. at 342. The Gertz Court divided its public figure
classification into two categories: 1) all purpose public figures, and 2) limited
purpose public figures. Id. at 345. "All purpose" public figures are those plain-
tiffs who "occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are
deemed public figures for all purposes." Id. More common is the "limited pur-
pose" public figure, who "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of
issues." Id. at 351. For a discussion of damages recoverable under Gertz, see
infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. For a discussion of limited purpose
public figures in later Supreme Court decisions, see infra note 6. See generally
Comment, Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine Revisited, 54 TUL. L. REV. 1053
(1980).
6. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2946
(1985) (recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation actions ab-
sent showing of actual malice does not violate first amendment when defamatory
statements do not involve "matters of public concern"); Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979) (holding that plaintiff had not volun-
tarily thrust himself into a public controversy and rejecting proposition that one
who engages in criminal activity automatically becomes limited purpose public
figure); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (finding no public
controversy prior to publication of allegedly defamatory statements, and noting
that libel defendants may not, by publicizing plaintiff's activities, create their
own defense); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (holding that
"public controversy" could not be equated with all controversies of interest to
public, and that evidence did not establish voluntary involvement by plaintiff).
See generally Comment, supra note 5.
7. The following questions are illustrative. How and why should plaintiffs
be classified as public officials, public figures or private figures? See generally
Schauer, Public Figures, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905 (1984) (questioning legiti-
macy of equating public figures with public officials for purposes of actual malice
protection). For a discussion of the public figure determination, see infra notes
39-61, 89-133 and accompanying text. How is a court to identify a "public con-
troversy?" See generally Note, Defining a Public Controversy in the Constitutional Law of
Defamation, 69 VA. L. REV. 931 (1983) (arguing that present definitional ambigui-
ties lead courts to unprincipled ad hoc decisions regarding existence of public
controversies). For a discussion of the public controversy requirement, see infra
notes 43-45, 93-96 and accompanying text. How far should the constitutional
limitations extend? See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 105
S. Ct. 2939 (1985). See generally Note, Mediaocracy and Mistrust: Extending New
York Times Defamation Protection to Nonmedia Defendants, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1876
(1982) (offering context oriented methodology to justify extension of New York
Times protection to nonmedia defendants).
8. 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1985). The case was
heard by Circuit Judges Adams, Higginbotham, and Van Dusen. 754 F.2d at
1075. The opinion was written by Judge Adams. Id.
9. Id. at 1080. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's resolution of these
issues, see infra notes 87-133 and accompanying text.
2
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Circuit. '0 However, Marcone is representative of the Third Circuit's will-
ingness to expand the public figure doctrine in order to provide greater
first amendment protection for the media.'I
In Marcone, Penthouse International, Ltd. (Penthouse) published
and distributed for sale the November 1978 issue of Penthouse, The Inter-
national Magazine for Men which contained an article entitled, "The Ston-
ing of America,"' 12 authored by Edward Rasen. 13 The article refered to
"criminal attorneys and attorney criminals" involved in drug transac-
tions and cited Frank Marcone as an example.1 4 The article stated that
"Frank Marcone, an attorney from the Philadelphia area, contributed
down payments of up to $25,000 on grass transactions. Charges against
him were dismissed because he cooperated with further
investigations." 15
10. See Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 648-50 (3d Cir.) (addressing whether
a former law school dean was a limited purpose public figure in the context of
his law school's accreditation struggle, and whether he had proven actual mal-
ice), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d
264, 266 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing whether a meat producer who aggressively
advertised his product was a limited purpose public figure in the context of com-
ment on the quality of that product, and whether he had proven actual malice);
Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1979)
(en banc) (considering whether a football player was a limited purpose public
figure in the context of discussion concerning his health, without reaching the
issue of actual malice). The Third Circuit has had subsequent opportunity to
further address issues concerning public figure status and actual malice. See Mc-
Dowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942 (3d Cir. 1985) (considering whether an ar-
chitect-engineer involved in public building projects is public figure for
purposes of comment on his work with publicly financed projects, and whether
the defamatory statements were made with actual malice).
11. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's liberal view of the public figure
doctrine, see infra notes 87-133 and accompanying text.
12. 754 F.2d at 1076. The article concerned the emergence of marijuana
trade as a multi-billion dollar industry. Id. The article is subtitled, "Marijuana is
now big agri-business-a $12 billion a year corporate growth crop." Id.
13. Edward Rasen was named as a party but was not served in the action.
Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 533 F. Supp. 353, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
14. 754 F.2d at 1076-77. Frank Marcone, an attorney maintaining an office
in Media, Pennsylvania, was indicted in February of 1976 by a Federal Grand
jury for conspiring with other named defendants to possess and distribute mari-
juana. Id. at 1076. The indictment charged, inter alia:
[i]t was further a part of said conspiracy that defendant and co-conspir-
ator FRANK MARCONE, during the period of this conspiracy, would
supply sums of United States currency to defendant and co-conspirator
FREDERICK R. FREY in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for the purpose of
investing said monies in the distribution of marijuana by FREDERICK
R. FREY for a profit.... During May, 1974, FRANK MARCONE gave
$25,000 in United States currency to FREDERICK R. FREY in Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania, for the purpose of purchasing multi-hundred
pound quantities of marijuana in California.
Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 533 F. Supp. 353, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
15. 754 F.2d at 1077. However, the court found that the charges were actu-
ally dismissed because of "legal technicalities" in tying Marcone to the larger
conspiracy." Id. at 1076. The dismissal was without prejudice to his being re-
3
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Marcone brought a diversity action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Penthouse claim-
ing that the article's statements concerning him were false and defama-
tory. 16 Penthouse moved for summary judgment on six grounds,
among them that Marcone had failed to prove actual malice as required
for public figures in defamation actions.1 7 The district court denied the
motion, holding inter alia,'8 that Marcone "was not a public figure"' 9
and thus that he need not meet the higher burden of proof. The case
was tried before a jury which returned a verdict for Marcone in the
indicted in Philadelphia. Id. at 1076. Nevertheless, a second indictment was
never brought. Id.
16. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 533 F. Supp. 353, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Marcone asserted that the use of the phrase "attorney criminals" was defama-
tory and that the mention of his name in the context of the article was defama-
tory in that it implied that he participated or was involved in the type of illegal
activities discussed in the article. Id. at 357.
17. Id. Specifically, Penthouse argued
(1) the statements are not capable of defamatory meaning; (2) even if
defamatory, the statements are privileged under Pennsylvania law as a
substantially fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding; (3) plain-
tiff is a public figure and cannot make the showing of actual malice re-
quired of public figures by the first amendment; (4) the article involved
matters of public concern and under Pennsylvania law, in cases where
the alleged defamatory publication involved matters of 'public or gen-
eral concern,' the defendant [sic] must prove actual malice, and plaintiff
cannot make such a showing in this case; (5) the statements are true,
and (6) the plaintiff cannot prove special damages.
Id.
18. Id. In disposing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the district
court found that Pennsylvania law applied, as appropriately limited by the first
amendment. Id. (citing Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 270 (3d
Cir. 1980) (general discussion of prima facie elements of defamation case under
state and federal law). Furthermore, the court found that the statements con-
cerning Marcone were actionable as libel per se as they imputed the commission
of an indictable crime by Marcone. Id. at 357-58 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 571 (1977)). The court also noted that the statements were not a
fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding, and therefore were not entitled
to the protection of conditional privilege. Id. at 358-59 (citing Binder v. Trian-
gle Publications, 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 53 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 611 (1977)). The court found that Marcone was not a public figure. Id.
at 359. Additionally, the court posited that Pennsylvania would no longer follow
the decision in Matus v. Triangle Publications, Inc., and therefore a private fig-
ure defamation plaintiff could recover under Pennsylvania law based upon a
showing of negligence, regardless of whether the statement involved matters of
"public or general concern." Id. at 361 (citing Matus v. Triangle Publications,
445 Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972)). Finally, the
court found that because the statements were determined to be libellous per se,
no special damages need be assessed. Id. (citing Baird v. Dun & Bradstreet, 446
Pa. 266, 285, 285 A.2d 166, 177 (1971); Solosko v. Parton, 383 Pa. 419, 119
A.2d 230, 232 (1956)).
19. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 533 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1982). For
a discussion of the different burdens of proof required for public figures and
private figures, see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
1248
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/15
1986] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 1249
amount of $30,000 compensatory and $537,000 punitive damages. 20
Following an appeal by Penthouse, the Third Circuit reversed, holding
that Marcone was a limited purpose public figure 2 ' and that his failure
to meet the commensurate burden of proving actual malice precluded
recovery.
2 2
The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that a defamation suit
is fundamentally a state law cause of action. 2 3 Accordingly, Judge Ad-
ams proceeded to analyze Penthouse's contentions2 4 within the frame-
work of Pennsylvania's law.
2 5
20. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 577 F. Supp. 318, 322 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
Penthouse moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alterna-
tive, for a new trial. Id. at 323. The district court denied Penthouse's motions
conditioned upon the plaintiff's acceptance of a remittitur of the punitive dam-
age award to $200,000. Id. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the
court's granting of a remittitur, but the court found no reason to alter its prior
decision. Id. at 336. The district court held that in the event of a new trial, the
scope of such trial would be limited to the issues of the existence of actual malice
and the amount of any punitive damages to be awarded. Id. at 338-39. The
plaintiff subsequently accepted the remittitur. 754 F.2d at 1077. The award as
modified was $30,000 in compensatory damages, and $200,000 in punitive dam-
ages. Id.
21. 754 F.2d at 1086-87. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's
decision to classify Marcone as a limited purpose public figure, see infra notes
41-62 and accompanying text.
22. 754 F.2d at 1089-91. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's anal-
ysis under the actual malice standard, see infra notes 71-86 and accompanying
text.
23. 754 F.2d at 1077. The Third Circuit noted, however, that adjudication
of a defamation action was "replete with First Amendment implications." Id.
The court explained that in adjudicating a defamation action, a court must de-
termine both state and federal law questions: "(1) whether the defendants have
harmed the plaintiff's reputation within the meaning of state law; and (2) if so,
whether the First Amendment nevertheless precludes recovery." Id. (quoting
Steaks Unlimited, v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 270 (3d Cir. 1980)).
24. 754 F.2d at 1077-87. Penthouse contended first that Marcone had not
met the burden of proof concerning the defamatory character of the article. Id.
at 1078. For a discussion of plaintiff's burden of proof, see infra notes 24-28
and accompanying text. Penthouse next argued that Marcone was "libel-proof."
Id. For a discussion of the libel-proof doctrine, see infra notes 30-33 and accom-
panying text. Penthouse further argued that failure to prove special damages
warranted dismissal. Id. at 1079. For a discussion of special damages, see infra
note 37 and accompanying text. Additionally, Penthouse contended that Mar-
cone was a public figure and, therefore, that the district court should have ap-
plied the actual malice rather than the negligence standard. Id. at 1080. For a
discussion of the public figure doctrine, see infra notes 38-62. Penthouse also
argued that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the actual
malice standard for punitive damages. Id. at 1087. For a discussion of the actual
malice standard, see infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
25. 754 F.2d at 1077-78. Under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving: 1) the defamatory character of the communication, 2) its publi-
cation by the defendant, 3) its application to the plaintiff, 4) an understanding by
the recipient of its defamatory meaning, 5) an understanding by the recipient
that the statement was intended to be applied to the plaintiff, 6) special harm
resulting to the plaintiff from its publication, and 7) if a conditional privilege is
5
Foley: Torts - Defamation - Public Figure Doctrine Will Be Used Expansiv
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
1250 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31: p. 1245
Penthouse urged that Marcone had failed to prove the article's de-
famatory character, arguing that the individual phrases referring to Mar-
cone, in isolation, could not be understood as libelous.2 6 The court
noted, however, that Pennsylvania law requires that "the allegedly
libelous communication be read as a whole, in context" to determine
whether it is defamatory. 27 The Third Circuit recognized that under
Pennsylvania law, a statement is defamatory if the general tendency of
the words is to "harm the reputation of another so as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him."' 28 The Third Circuit concluded that the article's
title, along with its references to Marcone, suggested that Marcone had
committed an indictable offense and was therefore capable of defama-
tory meaning as a matter of law. 29
The Third Circuit next dealt with the defendant's contention that
Marcone's reputation was so tarnished prior to publication of the alleg-
edly defamatory statement that he was "libel proof."'3 ° To support its
raised, abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion. Id. at 1077-78 (citing 42 PA.
CONST. STAT. § 8343(a) (1982); Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432,
273 A.2d 899 (1971); Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 334 Pa. Super. 295, 483
A.2d 456 (1984)).
26. 754 F.2d at 1078. For example, Penthouse asserted that its report that
Marcone "cooperated with further investigations" could not by itself be under-
stood as libelous. Id.
27. Id. (citing Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 444, 273 A.2d
899, 906 (1971); Agriss v. Roadway Express, 334 Pa. Super. 295, 304-05, 483
A.2d 456, 461 (1984)).
28. Id. at 1078 (quoting Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 442,
273 A.2d 899, 904 (1971)).
29. Id. The article was entitled "The Stoning of America." Id. It made
reference to "attorney criminals" and listed Frank Marcone as an example. Id.
The article also stated that "Frank Marcone, an attorney from the Philadelphia
area, contributed down payments of up to $25,000 on grass transactions.
Charges against him were dropped because he cooperated with further investi-
gations." Id. See Baird v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 446 Pa. 266, 274, 285 A.2d
166, 171 (1971) (statements inputing commission of indictable offenses are ca-
pable of defamatory meaning as matter of law); see also Agriss v. Roadway Ex-
press, 334 Pa. Super. 295, 323, 483 A.2d 456, 471 (1984) (false statements
charging criminal activity actionable as libel per se).
30. 754 F.2d at 1078. The libel proof doctrine provides that where a plain-
tiff's reputation is sufficiently poor before the defamatory statement is made he
or she is only entitled to nominal damages as a matter of law. Id. (quoting
Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 928 (C.D. Cal. 1982)).
To invoke the doctrine, the plaintiff must have an extensive history of anti-social
or criminal behavior, and the alleged defamatory communication must specifi-
cally relate to that behavior. Id.; see also Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d
638 (2d Cir. 1975) (prisoner serving 21 years sentenced for assorted federal
crimes with several previous convictions for other crimes held libel proof). Ad-
ditionally, in some circumstances, a plaintiff's general reputation for honesty
and fair dealing may be so poor that the plaintiff will be considered "libel
proof" on all matters. Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924,
928 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (noting that invocation of the doctrine depends on 1) the
nature of the conduct, 2) the number of offenses, and 3) the degree and range of
6
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contention, Penthouse cited a series of negative publicity items regard-
ing Marcone from 1976 onward. 3 1 However, the court, noting that the
"libel proof" doctrine is to be construed narrowly, 32 declined to hold
that Marcone was "libel proof" as a matter of law.
3 3
Penthouse also argued that Marcone's suit should be dismissed be-
cause he failed to prove any actual economic harm.34 The Third Circuit,
relying on Gertz rejected the defendant's argument, noting that proof of
actual economic loss is not required under federal constitutional law. 35
Additionally, the court dismissed Penthouse's assertion that Marcone's
failure to prove special damages warranted dismissal of his action, deter-
mining that such proof was not required under Pennsylvania law. 36
publicity received). But see Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563,
1569 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting libel-proof doctrine as "fundamentally bad
idea").
31. 754 F.2d at 1079. Penthouse cited the fact that the Philadelphia-area
media had widely publicized Marcone's 1976 drug trafficking indictment. Id.
Also, Penthouse noted that a number of newspaper articles had linked Marcone
to motorcycle gangs and their headquarters, both the subject of criminal investi-
gations. Id. Additionally, Marcone's 1978 trial for tax evasion, which ended in a
hung jury, had received widespread media attention. Id. Additionally, Marcone
was fined twice for contempt for failing to appear at scheduled hearings,
although the second contempt citation occurred subsequent to publication of
the defendant's article. Id. Finally, Penthouse noted that Marcone had been
fined for punching a police officer. Id.
32. Id. (citing Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d. Cir. 1976) (libel proof
doctrine is narrow), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977)).
33. Id. The Third Circuit acknowledged, however, that evidence of a poor
reputation is relevant as a mitigating factor in determining compensatory dam-
ages, and that the jury's award may have reflected Marcone's already tarnished
reputation at the time the article was written. Id.
34. Id. The Third Circuit acknowledged that a motion for dismissal based
on failure to prove actual harm "has both constitutional as well as state law
dimensions." Id. For a more complete discussion of the constitutional require-
ments regarding proof of damages, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
35. 754 F.2d at 1079. Under the traditional approach, the existence of in-
jury is presumed from the fact of publication. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. Juries,
therefore, were permitted to award compensatory damages for supposed injury
to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred. Id. In order
to reconcile the states' interest in compensating individuals for harm to their
reputations with the competing interest in free speech guaranteed by the first
amendment, the Supreme Court held that states could no longer permit recov-
ery of presumed or punitive damages except upon a showing of actual malice.
Id. But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2946
(1985) (recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation actions ab-
sent showing of actual malice does not violate first amendment when defamatory
statements do not involve matters of public concern). The Gertz Court stated,
however, that in limiting plaintiffs in libel actions against media defendants to
compensation for "actual injury," it was not limiting "actual injury" to out-of-
pocket loss-that is, economic loss. 418 U.S. at 350. The Court reasoned that
the concept of actual harm includes impairment of reputation and standing in
the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Id.
36. 754 F.2d at 1079-80. The Third Circuit adopted the lower court's hold-
ing that the article constituted libel per se and therefore proof of special dam-
7
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After disposing of the issues of state law, the Third Circuit turned
to the federal constitutional questions.3 7 After discussing the concurrent
evolution of state and federal libel law, 38 the court focused on whether
Marcone was a public figure. 39
The Third Circuit, relying on Gertz, acknowledged that the Supreme
Court has defined two categories of public figures: all purpose public
figures and limited purpose public figures. 40 The court also recognized
that plaintiffs in either category must meet the New York Times actual mal-
ice standard to recover in a libel action against a media defendant.4 '
With these distinctions in place, the Third Circuit addressed the is-
sue of whether Marcone could be classified as a limited purpose public
figure. 42 To make this determination in light of Marcone's alleged in-
volvement in the purchase and sale of illicit drugs, the court stated that
two issues had to be considered: "1) whether drug trafficking is a public
ages was not required. Id. (citing Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 533 F. Supp. 353,
361 (E.D. Pa. 1982)); see Agriss v. Roadway Express, 334 Pa. Super. 295, 317-29,
483 A.2d 456, 468-74 (1984) (reasserting traditional rule in Pennsylvania that a
plaintiff may recover in libel action without proof of special damages). Special
damage is "harm of a material and generally of a pecuniary nature." Agriss, 334
Pa. Super. at 320, 483 A.2d at 469 (citation omitted), cited with approval in Mar-
cone, 754 F.2d at 1080 n.l. The court concluded that Marcone was entitled to
damages for injury to his reputation and any personal humiliation or mental
anguish suffered as a result of the alleged defamation. 754 F.2d at 1080. How-
ever, recovery for such actual injury must be based upon "competent evidence
of such harm." Id. The court considered that while Marcone's testimony con-
cerning actual injury "contained some inconsistencies, it was possible for the
jury to assess his credibility and determine whether he actually suffered any
harm." Id. For a discussion of the distinction between the terms libel per se and
libel per quod and their relevance in the modern law of libel, see Agriss, 334 Pa.
Super. at 317-29, 483 A.2d at 468-74; W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 113 (5th ed.
1984).
37. 754 F.2d at 1080. For a discussion of the federal constitutional limits
on modern defamation actions, see supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
38. 754 F.2d at 1080-81. For a discussion of the "constitutionalization" of
state libel law, see supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
39. 754 F.2d at 1082. The court stated that: "The classification of a plain-
tiff as a public or private figure is a question of law to be determined initially by
the trial court and then carefully scrutinized by an appellate court." Id. at 1081
n.4 (citing Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F.2d 375, 379 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 964 (1981); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1974); Avins
v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980)).
40. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345). For a description of all purpose and
limited purpose public figures, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
41. 754 F.2d at 1081-82. Classification of a plaintiff as a public figure is an
important determination in any libel action against a media defendant because it
triggers the actual malice standard for liability. See generally Franklin, Suing Media
for Libek A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 795 (noting diffi-
culty public figures encounter in surmounting actual malice barrier). Private
figures must similarly overcome the actual malice barrier to recover punitive
damages. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
42. 754 F.2d at 1082. Penthouse did not contend, nor did the Third Circuit
hold, that Marcone was an all purpose public figure. Id.
1252 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1245
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controversy, and 2) the nature and extent of Marcone's participation in
that controversy."
4 3
With regard to the public controversy issue, the Third Circuit found
that the present case clearly involved a public controversy-that is, "a
real dispute the outcome of which affects the general public or some
segment of it."'4 4 The Third Circuit concluded that because the drug
trafficking at issue was of such "mammoth proportions", it clearly fell
within the definition of public controversy. 45
The issue of the "nature and extent" of Marcone's participation in
the public controversy, however, presented the court with a more diffi-
cult problem. 4 6 The Third Circuit began by noting that "[i]n general, to
be a limited purpose public figure, the plaintiff must voluntarily thrust
himself into the vortex of the dispute. From the voluntary act is derived
the notion of assumption of the risk and the consequent fairness in la-
belling the person a public figure."' 47 After listing several ways in which
an individual may attain public figure status,4 8 the court turned specifi-
43. Id. (citing Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 647 (3d Cir.) (setting forth two
prong inquiry), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980)).
44. Id. at 1083 (quoting Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d
1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980)). "To be public," said
the court, "the dispute must affect more than its immediate participants." Id. at
1083. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in defining a public contro-
versy, see Note, Defining a Public Controversy in the Constitutional Law of Defamation,
69 VA. L. REV. 931 (1983), cited in Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1083 n.7. For a discus-
sion of the Third Circuit's reasoning in this regard, see infra notes 93-96 and
accompanying text.
45. 754 F.2d at 1083. At the time of Marcone's indictment, law enforce-
ment officials contended that the conspiracy involved the largest drug smuggling
operation ever uncovered in the United States. Id. The Third Circuit rejected
the argument that, because most people would agree that drug smuggling is
undesirable, there was no "controversy" regarding the matter. Id. at 1083 n.8
(citing Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 163 n.6 (1979)); see also
Note, supra note 42, at 941-42. For a discussion of this argument, see infra note
94.
46. 754 F.2d at 1085-86.
47. Id. at 1083; accord Gertz, 418 U.S. 434, 435. For a discussion of the
Third Circuit's conception of the public figure doctrine, see infra notes 87-133
and accompanying text.
48. 754 F.2d at 1083. The Third Circuit noted: "In the typical limited pur-
pose public figure case, the plaintiff actively participates in the public issue in a
manner intended to obtain attention." Id. (citing Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. De-
aner, 623 F.2d 264, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1980) (meat producer who aggressively ad-
vertises his product in the media becomes a limited purpose public figure for
comment on product's quality); Woy v. Turner, 573 F. Supp. 35, 38 (N.D. Ga.
1983) (agent who holds news conference to attract media attention for himself
and his client is a public figure in that context)). The Marcone court also stated:
"A plaintiff's action itself may invite comment and attention," regardless of the
plaintiff's intentions. Id. (citing Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, 411 F. Supp.
440, 445 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aft'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978) (longstanding asso-
ciation with organized crime figures gives plaintiff limited purpose public figure
status)). Additionally, the court recognized that other individuals are deemed
limited purpose public figures because of their "status, position or associa-
1986] 1253
9
Foley: Torts - Defamation - Public Figure Doctrine Will Be Used Expansiv
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
cally to whether the nature and extent of Marcone's alleged involvement
in the drug trafficking conspiracy was sufficient to elevate him to public
figure status.4 9 The court identified three factors pertinent to that de-
termination: 1) Marcone's indictment in the drug trafficking conspiracy;
2) his representational ties to motorcycle gang members; and 3) his non-
representational ties to motorcycle gang members. 50
Regarding Marcone's indictment and the attendant publicity, the
Third Circuit stated that "[a]lthough the criminal activity, by itself, may
not create public figure status, such activity may, nevertheless, be one
element in a mix of factors leading to that classification."' 5' Moreover,
the court took notice of the fact that Marcone was indicted for participat-
ing, "not in a passive manner," in a drug conspiracy. 52
Marcone's representational ties to motorcycle gang members 53 did
not represent a significant factor in the Third Circuit's analysis. 54 The
court commented that legal representation of notorious groups,
although inviting public attention, did not, by itself, create public figure
status. 55 Moreover, the court found nothing in the record to indicate
that Marcone had attempted to bring attention to himself or his clients
tions." Id. (citing Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265,
1280 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (professional football player's status invites gen-
eral public discussion, making him a public figure in that context); Rosanova, 411
F. Supp. 440, 449 (plaintiff voluntarily engaged in a course of conduct bound to
invite attention and comment). See generally Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The
Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 69-71 (1983) (listing
types of individuals found by courts to be public figures), cited in Marcone, 754
F.2d at 1083 n.8.
49. 754 F.2d at 1084.
50. Id. at 1085. "Representational ties" refers to Marcone's professional
relationship as an attorney with the motorcycle gangs. Nonrepresentational ties
refers to his social contacts with the gangs. For a discussion of the relevance of
these factors in the Third Circuit's analysis, see infra notes 107-20 and accompa-
nying text.
51. 754 F.2d at 1085 (citing Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, 411 F. Supp.
440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aft'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978) (longstanding associa-
tion with organized crime sufficient to render plaintiff a public figure; cf. Wol-
ston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979) (rejecting the prop-
osition that any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes
a public figure for purposes of comment on a limited range of issues relating to
his conviction); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976) (status as par-
ticipant in litigation does not automatically render one a public figure).
52. 754 F.2d at 1085 (citing Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979)).
53. Id. Marcone had a significant criminal practice and frequently repre-
sented the Pagan and Warlock motorcycle gangs in legal matters. Id.
54. Id. at 1086.
55. Id. at 1085. The Third Circuit stated that to hold otherwise would place
an undue burden on attorneys who represent famous or notorious clients. Id.(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352; Steere v. Cupp, 226 Kan. 566, 571, 602 P.2d 1267,
1272-74 (1979) (attorney who actively represents a client does not become lim-
ited purpose public figure without additional evidence of an attempt to gain
public attention to influence outcome of the controversy)).
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in regard to their legal relationships. 56
Finally, the Third Circuit considered Marcone's non-representa-
tional contacts with motorcycle gang members. 5 7 The court noted that
Marcone had reportedly met at the Pagans' headquarters (the "Castle")
with indicted co-conspirators Frey, Heron, and Mealy, and that he had
occasionally accompanied them on weekend trips. 58 In analyzing these
factors, the court stated that it must "look to Marcone's actions in addi-
tion to his intentions." 5 9 Accordingly, the court concluded that "Mar-
cone's non-representational ties to the Castle and the Pagans [were]
sufficient to tip the balance in the [public figure] calculation." '60
The court concluded that Marcone had crossed the threshold and
become a limited purpose public figure due to the public nature of the
indictment, the widespread media attention, and his significant non-rep-
resentational ties to the Pagans. 6 1 The court determined it was irrele-
vant that Marcone had not sought public figure status.6 2
56. Id. at 1086. However, the Third Circuit recognized that: "Of course, if
an attorney does more than merely represent the client in a strictly legal con-
text-such as holding news conferences or otherwise affirmatively making a pub-
lic issue of the case-then those activities may be counted in the public figure
calculus." Id.; see also Steere v. Cupp, 226 Kan. 566, 571, 602 P.2d 1267, 1273-
74, cited in Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1085-86.
57. 754 F.2d at 1086. The court stated that these contacts were "[m]ore
important for the limited purpose public figure determination" than either Mar-
cone's indictment or his representational ties to gang members. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. Although the evidence showed no intent to attract attention, the
court noted that it may be sufficient that "Marcone [was] engaged in a course of
conduct that was bound to attract attention and comment." Id. (citing Rosanova
v. Playboy Enterprises, 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978)) (quoting Rosanova v.
Playboy Enterprises, 411 F. Supp. 440, 445 (S.D. Ga. 1976)).
60. Id. The court stated that "[b]oth the Pagans and their headquarters
were linked to the two billion dollar drug ring, i.e., the public controversy sur-
rounding the alleged libel." Id. Marcone's voluntary association with the gang,
and the media attention he consequently attracted, were enough to "tip the bal-
ance" in favor of his classification as a public figure for the limited purpose of his
connection with drug trafficking. Id.
61. Id.; see Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, 411 F. Supp. 440, 446 (S.D.
Ga. 1976) ("The purposes of the first amendment would be frustrated if those
persons and activities that most require public scrutiny could wrap themselves in
a veil of secrecy and thus remain beyond the reach of public knowledge."), ajfd,
580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
62. 754 F.2d at 1086-87. The court found that Marcone was a "public fig-
ure for the limited purpose of his connection with illicit drug trafficking." Id.
The court acknowledged that it was a "close case," which turned on a considera-
tion of "all the relevant factors . . . [viewed] in context and as a whole." Id. at
1086. The court emphasized that it was not holding that "an attorney whose
connection to notorious clients remains purely professional or any person
charged with a crime automatically becomes a limited purpose public figure."
Id. at 1087 n. 11. The court concluded that the district court erred in not classi-
fying Marcone as a limited purpose public figure. Id. at 1087. For a discussion
of the court's reasoning in this regard, see infra notes 87-127 and accompanying
text.
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Once the court had classified Marcone as a public figure for the lim-
ited purpose of his connection with drug trafficking, it turned to the
question of actual malice.6 3 The district court had considered Marcone
to be a private figure and, therefore, had not required that he meet the
actual malice standard in order to recover compensatory damages. 6 4 As
a private figure, he was entitled to an award of compensatory damages
merely upon a showing of negligence. 65 However, the district court did
require a showing of actual malice for Marcone to recover punitive dam-
ages. 66 The Third Circuit considered the jury's decision to award puni-
tive damages to be an indication that Marcone had met the actual malice
standard required of limited purpose public figures under Gertz.6 7 Thus
the court noted it could uphold the damage award, as long as the judge
had correctly charged the jury.68 However, the court agreed with Pent-
house that the district judge had misstated the actual malice standard, 69
and incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the proper burden of proof
required for punitive damages. 70 As a consequence, the Third Circuit
declared that the punitive damage award "was made under a constitu-
tionally deficient standard," and, therefore, the verdict could not be
used as a predicate to affirm the award of compensatory and punitive
damages. 71 However, rather than remand for a new trial, the Third Cir-
63. 754 F.2d at 1087. The court recognized that "[p]ublic officials and
public figures must prove actual malice." Id. at 1081-82. For a discussion of the
actual malice requirements, see supra note 2.
64. 754 F.2d at 1087.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. For a discussion of the fault requirements established by Gertz, see
supra note 5 and accompanying text.
68. 754 F.2d at 1087. The court stated that if the jury had "properly found
that Marcone [had] proven that Penthouse published the article with actual mal-
ice, [then their] award of compensatory and punitive damages could [have been]
upheld." Id.
69. Id. The district judge incorrectly instructed the jury:
The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defama-
tory portions of the article were published either with knowledge of
their falsity or with reckless disregard as to whether they were true or
false. Punitive damages for the purpose of punishing a defendant for
its outrageous conduct if you find, of course, that the plaintiff has
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct of the defendant
was outrageous.
Id. (emphasis added by court of appeals). The Third Circuit stated that although
the instruction that the plaintiff had to prove "outrageous conduct" was an accu-
rate reflection of Pennsylvania law, it did not connote the subjective awareness
of falsity required by the first amendment. Id. at 1088. For a discussion of the
subjective awareness of the falsity requirement, see supra note 2 and accompany-
ing text.
70. 754 F.2d at 1088. The district court judge instructed the jury that the
burden of proof required was "preponderance of the evidence." The correct
standard is "clear and convincing" evidence. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342;
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86).
71. Id.
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cuit elected to make a de novo review of the evidence of actual malice. 72
In reviewing the evidence, the Third Circuit addressed two inaccu-
racies in Penthouse's article relating to Marcone: 1) the statement that
Marcone had purchased $25,000 worth of marijuana when in fact he had
only been indicted for the offense, and 2) the statement that charges
against Marcone had been dropped because he cooperated with authori-
ties, when in fact they were dismissed without prejudice so that he could
be re-indicted in Philadelphia. 7 3
In regard to the first inaccuracy, Penthouse asserted that the error
was made without actual malice because its editors relied on the experi-
ence and professional reputation of Edward Rasen, the author who sub-
mitted the article.74 Moreover, Penthouse's editors did make an effort
to verify Rasen's information by obtaining a copy of the Detroit indict-
ment charging Marcone, 75 and an article from the Philadelphia Inquirer,
dated March 18, 1976, which reported Marcone's indictment. 76 The
Third Circuit stated that "[w]hile the newspaper article and the indict-
ment do not prove the truth of the assertion, they are sufficiently related
to the statement in question that we cannot say the whole story is a
fabrication or a product of the author's imagination."' 77 Thus, the court
concluded that the statement was not so "inherently improbable" as to
alert the publishers of its probable falsity. 78 The court stated that
although Penthouse may have been negligent in not further investigat-
ing the veracity of the statement, and in failing to distinguish between an
allegation and a proven fact, such failings did not, under these circum-
72. Id. The court considered a de novo review to be "not only within our
province, but ... an affirmative duty .. " Id. (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984)). See generally Comment,
The Expanding Scope of Appellate Review in Libel Cases- The Supreme Court Abandons the
Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review for Findings of Actual Malice, 36 MERGER L. REV.
711 (1985) (discussing impact of Bose Corp. on traditional appellate review
standards).
73. 754 F.2d at 1089-90.
74. Id. Regarding Penthouse's reliance on Rasen's professional reputation,
the court explained that "[f]ailure to investigate, without more, does not demon-
strate actual malice." Id. (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 288)). The court also noted that "[r]eliance
on the professional reputation of an author may help to defeat an allegation of
actual malice." 754 F.2d at 1089. However, the court cautioned, "[a] mere as-
sertion by the publisher that he thought the statement published to be true does
not automatically defeat actual malice." Id. The court concluded that "even if
Penthouse had failed to investigate, its reasonable reliance on Rasen arguably
would have been sufficient to defeat plaintiff's attempt to show actual malice."
Id.; see St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 ("reckless conduct is not measured by whether
a reasonably prudent man ... would have investigated before publishing"). For
a discussion of the actual malice standard, see supra note 2.
75. 754 F.2d at 1089-90.
76. Id. at 1090.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)).
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stances, establish actual malice. 79
Regarding the second inaccuracy, the court noted that it was merely
the result of a "mistake" and a "misreading." '8 0 The court noted that
Penthouse used as a source a report of a congressional hearing8 ' listing
the disposition of drug charges against a number of individuals, includ-
ing Marcone.8 2 At the beginning of the list was a reference to another
individual with a footnote stating that charges were dropped due to co-
operation.8 3 The court determined that someone at the magazine ap-
parently confused the individual referred to in the footnote with
Marcone.8 4 This mistake, reasoned the court, "might be called unpro-
fessional, even negligent, but it cannot be said to rise to the level of
actual malice." 8 5
The Third Circuit concluded that both mistakes concerning Mar-
cone appeared to be the result of "insufficient editorial verification and
checking procedures, but not of a conscious decision to present Mar-
cone in a false light."8 6 Accordingly, the court held that Marcone had
failed to prove either by clear and convincing evidence or even by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that Penthouse published the statements
with actual malice.8 7 The court reversed the judgment of the district
court and ordered that judgment be entered for Penthouse.88
The significance of the Marcone opinion rests with the Third Cir-
cuit's determination that Frank Marcone was a limited purpose public
figure.8 9 It is submitted that the court's reasoning in this regard indi-
79. Id.
80. Id. In fact, two earlier versions of the article stated that "charges were
dismissed in favor of another indictment." Id. Neither Penthouse's editorial di-
rector, nor the editor assigned to the article could explain why or when the arti-
cle was changed to assert that charges were dropped because Marcone
"cooperated with further investigations." Id.
81. Id. The report is entitled: Illicit Traffic in Weapons and Drugs Across the
United States-Mexican Border: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1977).
82. 754 F.2d at 1090.
83. Id. The individual named was Charles H. Hewitt. Id. The footnote
stated "Defendants [sic] sentence reduced at the request of the U.S. Attorney's
Office due to cooperation." Id. Hewitt's name was above Marcone's in the arti-
cle's list of "attorney criminals." Id.
84. Id. The Third Circuit stated that "[s]omeone at the magazine appar-
ently misread the footnote as also referring to the individuals listed below Hew-
itt, including Marcone, or somehow confused the two men." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. See generally Bloom, Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, [pt. 1]
28 VAND. L. REV. 247, 283-85 (1985) (failure to verify through available sources
is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard).
87. 754 F.2d at 1090. Ironically, the district court found that Marcone had
demonstrated actual malice by both clear and convincing evidence as well as a
preponderance of the evidence. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 533 F. Supp. 353
(E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1985).
88. 754 F.2d at 1091.
89. Id. at 1082-87. The Third Circuit also dealt with several issues concern-
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cates a more expansive view of the public figure doctrine than that pres-
ently embraced by the United States Supreme Court, thus affording the
media greater first amendment protection.
The United States Supreme court, in Gertz, defined limited purpose
public figures as those persons who "have thrust themselves to the fore-
front of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolu-
tion of the issues involved." 90 In Marcone, the Third Circuit applied the
Gertz definition to determine Marcone's public figure status91 focusing
on "1) whether drug trafficking is a public controversy, and 2) the 'na-
ture and extent' of Marcone's participation in that controversy." 92
In order to resolve whether drug trafficking constituted a public
controversy, the Third Circuit applied the public controversy definition
ing Pennsylvania defamation law and the issue of actual malice. See id. at 1077-
80, 1087-91. However, the Third Circuit's discussion of these issues is consis-
tent with established case law and therefore merits no further discussion. See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 771-805 (discussing common law of defa-
mation); Watkins & Schwartz, Gertz and the Common Law of Defamation: of Fault,
Nonmedia Defendants, and Conditional Privileges, 15 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 823 (1984)
(discussing interrelationship between Gertz and the common law regarding proof
of fault in actions against nonmedia defendants and the proper requirements for
establishing abuse of conditional privilege). The Third Circuit discussed Penn-
sylvania defamation law in Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d
Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the actual malice standard and its application in
libel cases, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
90. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. The Court restated the definition of a limited
purpose public figure later in the Gertz opinion as "an individual [who] volunta-
rily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby
becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Id. at 351. The "drawn
into" language has been interpreted by some courts as creating a third class of
public figures-that is, the "involuntary public figure" class. See 754 F.2d at
1084 n.9 (citing Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 272-73 (3d Cir.
1980); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 n.9 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980)). However, the Marcone court preferred to view
"involuntary public figures" not as a separate class, but "merely one way an
individual may come to be considered a general or limited purpose public fig-
ure." Id. It is not altogether clear how the Third Circuit's analysis differs in
substance from the views arguing that a separate class has been created. See
generally Rosen, Media Lament- The Rise and Fall of Involuntary Public Figures, 54 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 487 (1980) (post-Gertz cases signify retreat from expansive press
protections); Note, The Involuntary Public Figure Class of Gertz v. Robert Welch:
Dead or Merely Dormant?, 14 U. MICH.J. L. REF. 71 (1980) (trend of cases, lack of
clearly articulable standards, and Supreme Court's failure to mention class fol-
lowing Gertz indicate that involuntary public figure class is dead), cited in Marcone,
754 F.2d at 1084 n.9. In any event, the Supreme Court has stated that "in-
stances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare." Gertz, 418
U.S. at 345, quoted in Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1084 n.9. But cf. Dameron v. Washing-
ton Magazine, 779 F.2d 736, 741-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (air traffic controller invol-
untary public figure for limited purpose of comment on air crash), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986).
91. 754 F.2d at 1082.
92. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352; Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 647 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980)).
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developed by the District of Columbia Circuit.9 3 That definition re-
quires that "a public controversy" ... 'be a real dispute, the outcome of
which affects the general public or some segment of it' beyond the im-
mediate participants. 9 4 The Third Circuit found, without detailed dis-
cussion, 95 that the large scale drug smuggling operation involved in
93. Id. at 1083 (citing Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287,
1296 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980)). Waldbaum involved a libel
action by the president of a large consumer cooperative against a trade publica-
tion for allegedly defamatory statements concerning his ouster from the cooper-
ative. 627 F.2d at 1290. The court held that prior to publication of the article,
public controversies existed over cooperatives in general and Waldbaum's poli-
cies in particular. Id. at 1299.
94. 754 F.2d at 1083 (quoting Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627
F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980)). "Mere newswor-
thiness," said the court, "is not sufficient to create a public controversy." Id.
(citing Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979)). The
Third Circuit had previously cited the Waldbaum definition with approval in
Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 647 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980).
95. 754 F.2d at 1083. The court failed to specifically address why the facts
of Marcone satisfied the Waldbaum definition. Id. The defamatory statement as-
serted that "Marcone purchased $25,000 worth of marijuana as part of a drug
smuggling ring." Id. "In fact," stated the court, "Marcone ... was indicted for
conspiracy and other charges in a nationwide drug trafficking operation . . .
[which] [a]t the time ... was the largest drug smuggling operation ever uncov-
ered in the United States." Id. The court concluded that "[dlrug trafficking of
such mammoth proportions, which is one of the most troubling issues of our
time, surely falls within the ambit of public controversy." Id. It is suggested that
the Third Circuit's failure to more specifically address the public controversy
issue leaves the precise meaning of the Waldbaum definition unclear. For exam-
ple, why is drug smuggling a "real dispute." Most all agree that drug smuggling
is undesirable. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 n.8
(1979). In Wolston, while considering the public figure status of an individual
held in contempt for failing to appear before a grand jury investigating Soviet
espionage in the United States, the Court commented that it was hard pressed to
identify any public controversy since there was no public debate over the desira-
bility of Soviet espionage. Id. "[A]II responsible United States citizens were and
are opposed to it." Id. The Third Circuit rejected the Wolston "debate" notion
of public controversy. 754 F.2d at 1083 n.8 (citing Smolla, supra note 47, at 56-
57) (arguing that such an approach would be "ludicrous" and would eliminate
from the realm of public controversy issues such as crime and violence which are
universally condemned, but nonetheless deserving of first amendment protec-
tion). If "real dispute" does not refer to debatable subjects, what precisely does
it refer to? Or in the Third Circuit's language, how "troubling" must an issue
be? See 754 F.2d at 1083. It is suggested that the "real dispute" language pro-
vides little guidance to individuals and the media in identifying public controver-
sies. See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1293 (arguing that clear guidelines are important
for both individuals and the media).
The Third Circuit also failed to address the appropriate scope of the con-
troversy. 754 F.2d at 1083. Scope refers to how narrowly or broadly the contro-
versy at issue will be defined. See Note, supra note 7, at 955 n.140, cited in
Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1083 n.7. The Marcone court described the controversy
rather broadly as "drug trafficking." 754 F.2d at 1083. The commentator ar-
gues that a broad definition of the controversy allows courts to examine more
voluntary actions with respect to the controversy, and thereby manipulate public
figure status by expanding or contracting the scope of the controversy. See Note,
16
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Marcone satisfied this definition of public controversy. 9 6
The more significant issue that the Third Circuit addressed was
whether the "nature and extent" of Marcone's participation in the pub-
lic controversy was sufficient for him to have become a limited purpose
public figure. 9 7 The Third Circuit began its analysis by stating "[i]n
general, to be a limited purpose public figure, the plaintiff must volunta-
rily thrust himself into the vortex of the dispute. From the voluntary act
is derived the notion of assumption of the risk and the consequent fair-
ness in labelling the person a public figure."' 98 It is submitted that
although the Third Circuit requires voluntary involvement as a prereq-
uisite to limited purpose public figure status,9 9 Marcone indicates a will-
supra note 95, at 942. The Third Circuit did not address this issue. Compare
Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297 n.27 (no necessity to define the scope of the contro-
versy) with Harris v. Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687, 704 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (specification
of a controversy's scope is necessary).
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's analysis of the public controversy
requirement does not appear to be significantly different in practice than the
Rosenbloom public interest analysis. See Bruno & Stillman v. Globe Newspaper
Co., 633 F.2d 583, 590 (1st Cir. 1980) (lamenting that public controversy re-
quirement forces courts to engage in Rosenbloom-type public interest analysis
"from which the [Supreme] Court in Gertz felt it had liberated [them]."); Note,
supra note 97, at 944-45 (failure to adopt coherent standard results in perpetua-
tion of prohibited Rosenbloom public interest injury). For a discussion of the Ro-
senbloom standard, see supra notes 4-5.
96. 754 F.2d at 1083. The United States Supreme Court has provided little
guidance regarding the public controversy requirement, indicating only that
which will not suffice. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157,
167 (1979) (mere "newsworthiness" is not enough to establish public contro-
versy); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (general concern over
public expenditures is not particular enough to establish public controversy);
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (public controversy not
equated with all controversies of interest to the public).
97. 754 F.2d at 1083-87. Penthouse did not contend that Marcone was an
all purpose public figure. Id. It is clear that Marcone was not an individual who
wielded "persuasive power and influence," as the Supreme Court requires for
all-purpose public figures. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Nor had he achieved "gen-
eral fame or notoriety... " Id. at 345.
98. 754 F.2d at 1083. The Third Circuit adopted this definition from Gertz.
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Underlying this definition is the important normative
principle that "the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption
that ... public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of
injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them." Id. at 345. For a further
discussion of the Third Circuit's consideration of Gertz, see infra notes 121-25
and accompanying text.
99. See 754 F.2d at 1083-85. Voluntary involvement in the particular public
controversy at issue has been recognized as a necessary element in the public
figure equation in every Supreme Court decision since Gertz. See Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979) (plaintiff not a public figure
since he had not voluntarily thrust or injected himself into the forefront of the
public controversy); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (plaintiff
not a public figure since no controversy existed); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448, 453 (1976) (plaintiff not a public figure since resort to judicial process
is not voluntary, and in any event no controversy existed). Voluntariness is mea-
sured by the "nature and extent" of an individual's participation in the particu-
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ingness by the court to liberally construe that requirement as it has been
defined by the Supreme Court since Gertz.' 0 0
The post-Gertz cases indicate that the Supreme Court views the vol-
untariness requirement in a restrictive manner. In Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone,101 the Court declined to hold that Mary Firestone, the wife of a
wealthy industrialist, had voluntarily thrust herself into a public contro-
versy by resorting to judicial process to settle her marital difficulties.10 2
The Court held that resort to judicial process was not voluntary action
for purposes of the public figure analysis. 10 3 In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 10 4
the Court held that a research scientist who was libeled in a publication
which criticized excessive government grant expenditures had not vol-
untarily sought to influence the outcome of any public controversy and
furthermore, had no regular and continuing access to the media. 10 5 Fi-
nally, in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 10 6 the Court held that an
individual's failure to appear before a grand jury investigating Soviet
espionage was not evidence that he had thrust himself to the forefront of
any controversy. 10 7 Indeed, the Court felt that the plaintiff had been
dragged unwillingly into the controversy.10 8 The Court stated that "a
private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure
just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts
lar public controversy. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167; see also Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at
1297 ("trivial or tangential participation is not enough"). The Third Circuit has
consistently reiterated the Supreme Court's voluntariness requirement. See, e.g.,
McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 949 (3d Cir. 1985); Avins v. White, 627
F.2d 637, 648 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Steaks Unlimited, Inc.
v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1980). For a further discussion of the
Third Circuit's consideration of the voluntariness issue in the principal case, see
infra notes 104-27 and accompanying text.
100. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's restrictive application of the
public figure doctrine, see Smolla, supra note 47, at 49-60. For a discussion of
the Third Circuit's approach, see infra notes 103-127 and accompanying text.
101. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
102. Id. at 452-55. Initially, the Court held that the Firestones' divorce pro-
ceeding did not involve a public controversy. Id. at 454. The Court refused to
"equate 'public controversy' with all controversies of interest to the public." Id.
Moreover, the Court held Mary Firestone had not voluntarily publicized issues
relating to her divorce, despite the fact that she held several press conferences.
Id. n.3.
103. Id. at 454.
104. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
105. Id. at 134-35. The Court found that no public controversy existed
prior to publication of the article, and cautioned that those charged with defa-
mation could not create a public figure defense by pointing to their own article
as evidence that a controversy existed. Id. at 135.
106. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
107. Id. at 166-67.
108. Id. The Court noted that the plaintiff had not discussed the contempt
citation with the press. Id. at 167. According to the Court, the nature and ex-
tent of his voluntary participation was similar to that of Elmer Gertz. Id. (citing
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352).
1262 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1245
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public attention." 10 9 These cases indicate that the Supreme Court's
conception of the voluntariness requirement is fairly restrictive.1 10
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, adopts a more liberal view of
the voluntariness requirement. In Marcone, the Third Circuit relied
heavily on Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club I 11 and Rosanova v. Play-
boy Enterprises 1 12 to define the way in which one becomes a limited pur-
pose public figure. Both Rosanova and Chuy focus not on a plaintiff's
voluntary actions directed towards influencing public controversies, but
rather on a plaintiff's voluntary actions in associating with controversial
individuals. 113 As further analysis will demonstrate, the Third Circuit's
109. Id at 167. To do so, reasoned the Court, would be to reinstate the
prohibited Rosenbloom standard. Id. (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (actual malice protection extends to all matters of public
concern)).
110. See Smolla, supra note 47, at 49-60 (arguing that post-Gertz cases indi-
cate a narrow and restrictive approach to public figure doctrine).
111. 431 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979)
(en banc); see 754 F.2d at 1083-84 (quoting extensively from Chuy).
112. 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aft'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978);
see 754 F.2d at 1082-86 (quoting extensively from Rosanova).
113. In Chuy, the district court found that Donald Chuy, a professional foot-
ball player, had voluntarily invited attention and comment simply by choosing to
engage in a much-talked-about profession. 431 F. Supp. at 267. The court's
determination that Chuy was a public figure was based solely upon his associa-
tion with professional football, in spite of the lack of evidence that Chuy had
made any effort to influence a public controversy. Id. On appeal, the Third
Circuit agreed with the district court's decision, reasoning that professional
football players "generally assume a position of public prominence." 595 F.2d
at 1280. It is submitted that the court's focus on Chuy's entry into a much-
talked-about profession places little premium on the identification of voluntary
action directed towards the resolution of any particular controversy. Cf Wolston,
443 U.S. at 168 (plaintiff did not seek to influence the resolution of a contro-
versy, and therefore not a public figure); Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135 (plaintiff did
not thrust himself or his views into a controversy to influence others, and there-
fore not a public figure); Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454-55 (plaintiff assumed no spe-
cial prominence in resolution of public questions, and therefore not a public
figure); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (plaintiff did not attempt to influence outcome of a
public controversy, and therefore not a public figure); see also Jenoff v. Hearst
Corp., 644 F.2d 1004, 1007 (4th Cir. 1981). Jenoffinvolved a libel action by an
unpaid police informant against a Baltimore city newspaper for false statements
made about the plaintiff in an article concerning governmental use of informants
for domestic spying. Id. at 1005-07. Regarding the plaintiff's position as an
informant, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[h]is assumption of the informant's
role cannot constitute voluntary entry into public debate over the role of infor-
mants unless we are to hold that all informants, by virtue of that status, become
public figures. The use of such 'subject matter classifications' . . . has been au-
thoritatively rejected." Id. at 1007 (citing Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135; Firestone,
418 U.S. at 456). In this respect then, the Third Circuit's analysis in Chuy, is
similar to the all-purpose public figure analysis. For a discussion of the all-pur-
pose public figure analysis, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
In Rosanova, Louis Rosanova was referred to in a published statement as a
"mobster." 580 F.2d at 860. Although never convicted of a crime, Rosanova
had a long and well-publicized relationship with organized crime figures. Id. at
861. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Rosanova's voluntary association with or-
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decision to consider both voluntary associations, as well as voluntary at-
tempts to influence public controversies, indicates a more expansive
view of the public figure doctrine than that espoused by the Supreme
Court. 114
With regard to the "nature and extent" inquiry, the Third Circuit
focused initially on Marcone's indictment and the attendant publicity.' 15
In that context, the court cited Wolston where the Supreme Court re-
jected the contention that "any person who engages in criminal conduct
automatically becomes a public figure for purposes of comment on a
limited range of issues relating to his conviction." 1 16 In Wolston, the
ganized crime figures was a course of conduct "bound to invite attention and
comment." Id. In response to the plaintiff's argument that he never sought or
intended public figure status, the court responded that "[t]he purpose served by
limited protection to the publisher of comment upon a public figure would often
be frustrated if the subject of the publication could choose whether or not he
would be a public figure." Id. Regarding the nature of Louis Rosanova's "vol-
untary involvement," the court made clear that although he did not voluntarily
seek to influence the outcome of any particular public controversy, he could still
be deemed a public figure based on his voluntary choice to associate with con-
troversial individuals. Cf. Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 273
(3d Cir. 1980) (meat producer who launched an aggressive advertising campaign
had "voluntarily injected himself into a matter of public interest-indeed, [he]
appears to have created a controversy-for the purpose of influencing the con-
suming public"); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 648 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 982 (1980) (former law school dean who "spearheaded" a law school's ac-
creditation effort considered to have played an "affirmative and aggressive role
in the accreditation process" and thus deemed a public figure). For a discussion
of the distinction between voluntarily injecting oneself into a controversy to in-
fluence its outcome, and voluntarily associating with controversial individuals as
it relates to the principal case and the underlying principles of Gertz, see supra
notes 111-12 and infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
114. See Smolla, supra note 47, at 51-60 (asserting that Wolston, Hutchinson,
and Firestone indicate that the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the
public figure doctrine). For a discussion of the more restrictive approach, see
supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
115. 754 F.2d at 1085. The court noted that Marcone's indictment had re-
ceived widespread local media coverage. Id. Also, the local media had focused a
good deal of attention on the Pagan and Warlock motorcycle gangs in connec-
tion with their involvement in drug trafficking. Id.
116. 754 F.2d at 1085 (quoting Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168). But see Smolla,
supra note 47, at 57-58. Smolla criticizes the Supreme Court's rejection of the
proposition that any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically
achieves public figure status. Id. According to Smolla, such a rejection defines
the voluntariness requirement in the criminal context as voluntariness in getting
caught and convicted rather than voluntariness in engaging in criminal activity.
Id. Most criminals do not voluntarily submit to capture and conviction. Id.
Therefore, under the Court's reasoning, they cannot, without more, be deemed
public figures. Id. In that case, the public may be deprived of relevant informa-
tion concerning criminal investigations and prosecutions. Id.; cf Littlefield v.
Fort Dodge Messenger, 614 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1980) (lawyer practicing law in
violation of probation voluntarily chose to engage in prohibited activity, but not
because of desire to influence outcome of any controversy, and therefore not
public figure; moreover, public interest is irrelevant to public figure
determination).
1264
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Court emphasized that voluntary, active participation' 17 in a public con-
troversy should be the focus of the public figure determination, not par-
ticular criminal conduct' 18 or participation in other litigations.' 19 This
would appear to preclude the use of Marcone's indictment as a predicate
for finding public figure status. The Third Circuit, however, attempted
to distinguish Wolston 120 and considered evidence of criminal activity as
one of several factors leading to public figure status. 12 1
The Third Circuit focused next on Marcone's representational ties
to motorcycle gang members. 12 2 Although in Gertz the Supreme Court
indicated that representational ties normally would not play a role in a
public figure determination,' 2 3 the Third Circuit did accord limited sig-
117. See 443 U.S. at 166. The Court held that the plaintiff in Wolston was
not a public figure, despite his contempt citation for failure to appear before a
grand jury investigating Soviet espionage activities in the United States. Id. The
Court reasoned that because the government had pursued the plaintiff, "[i]t
would be more accurate to say that he was dragged unwillingly into the contro-
versy." Id.
118. See id. at 168-69. The Court reasoned that those who appear in court
to seek redress or defend themselves should not lose the protection against def-
amation afforded to private citizens simply by virtue of their being drawn into
the courtroom. Id. (citing Firestone, 424 U.S. at 457). But cf. Orr v. Argus Press
Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1116 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1978) (litigants
and criminal defendants may be public figures where their conduct in commu-
nity results in judicial proceeding about which public has need for information
and interpretation). Ali v. Daily News Pub. Co., 540 F. Supp. 142 (D.V.I. 1982)
(convict public figure citing Orr with approval).
119. For a discussion of this matter, see supra note 118.
120. 754 F.2d at 1085. The court attempted to distinguish Wolston by not-
ing that the crime involved in Wolston, a citation for contempt, was "particularly
passive." Id. Marcone, on the other hand, had been indicted for participating
"not in a passive manner," in a drug conspiracy. Id. It is suggested that this is a
distinction without a difference. A decision not to appear before a grand jury is
every bit as voluntary as a decision to involve oneself in a conspiracy.
121. 754 F.2d at 1085. The court also considered the publicity attending
the indictment to be an important factor. Id. It is submitted that other jurisdic-
tions would also accept evidence of criminal activity as a factor in the public
figure determination. See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d
1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir.) (court must consider the "facts taken as a whole"), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980); Velle Transcendental Research Ass'n v. Sanders,
518 F. Supp. 512, 516 (C.D. Ca. 1981) ("whether a particular plaintiff's activities
make him a limited purpose public figure is usually a very close question which
can be resolved only by considering the totality of the circumstances which com-
prise the publicity surrounding the controversy .... ). But see Wolston, 443 U.S.
at 169 (to consider criminal conduct dispositive in the public figure determina-
tion would "create an 'open season' for all who sought to defame persons con-
victed of a crime"). Wolston's logic, if accepted, would seem equally compelling
with respect to those merely indicted for a crime. Cf. Smolla, supra note 47, at 58
(arguing that commentary on criminal activity has great social importance and
should be given first amendment protection).
122. 754 F.2d at 1085. For a discussion of Marcone's representational ties
to the Pagan and Warlock motorcycle gangs, see supra notes 50-56 and accompa-
nying text.
123. See 418 U.S. at 352. The Gertz Court indicated, in dicta, however, that
1986] 1265
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nificance to Marcone's representational ties. 124 The fact that the court
gave such contacts significance, albeit limited significance, reinforces the
view that the Third Circuit considers voluntarily choosing to associate
with controversial individuals as equivalent to thrusting oneself to the
forefront of a public controversy.
Further evidence of the Third Circuit's liberal view of the public
figure doctrine is found in the court's consideration of Marcone's
nonrepresentational ties to the Pagans and Warlocks.125 In that con-
text, the court noted reports that Marcone had met at the Castle (Pagan
headquarters) with several indicted co-conspirators, and had occasion-
ally accompanied motorcycle gang members on weekend trips. 12 6 The
court then reasoned, in essence, that: 1) the Pagans and their headquar-
ters were linked to the drug smuggling ring, i.e., the public controversy,
2) Marcone had voluntarily associated with the Pagans and their head-
quarters, and therefore, 3) Marcone had voluntarily thrust himself into
the public controversy for public figure purposes. 127 In other words,
Marcone's voluntary choice to associate with controversial individuals or
groups was considered essentially analogous, for public figure purposes,
to a voluntary thrusting of himself into a public controversy.
It is submitted that this willingness to equate voluntary association
where an attorney makes positive efforts to engage the public's attention in or-
der to influence the outcome of a controversy relating to his client, then his
representational actions may be considered. Id.; see also Ratner v. Young, 465 F.
Supp. 386, 399-400 (D.V.I. 1979) (attorneys representing defendants in contro-
versial trial are public figures for comment on issues related to trial). It is sub-
mitted that nothing in the record indicates that Marcone made any effort to
engage the public's attention regarding motorcycle gangs or drug smuggling.
124. See 754 F.2d at 1086. Because the court found nothing in the record
to indicate that Marcone purposely publicized his legal relationship with motor-
cycle gangs, it follows that any significance attached to his relationship with mo-
torcycle gangs must relate to his decision to represent-that is, associate with
them. Id. In this regard, the court emphasized that it was not holding that "an
attorney whose connection to notorious clients remains purely professional...
automatically becomes a limited purpose public figure." Id. at 1087 n. 11 (empha-
sis added). Apparently, Marcone's failure to keep his contacts purely profes-
sional rendered his representational ties significant.
125. 754 F.2d at 1086. The Third Circuit noted that Marcone's
nonrepresentational ties were a "more important factor for the limited purpose
public figure determination." Id. In fact, it is submitted that those ties were not
merely important, but determinative in the court's analysis. Furthermore, it is
suggested that the indictment alone would have been insufficient in light of Wol-
ston. See supra note 117. Additionally, it is submitted that representation by itself
would have been insufficient in light of Gertz. See supra notes 5 and 123. It is
further submitted that it is unlikely that these two factors together would have
been sufficient because they do not, taken together, evidence any real voluntary
conduct directed towards influencing the outcome of a controversy.
126. 754 F.2d at 1086.
127. See id. The Third Circuit noted that these factors were "in conjunction
with the intense media attention [Marcone] engendered." Id. For a discussion
of the extent of publicity engendered, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying
text.
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with the Gertz voluntary thrusting of oneself to the forefront of a public
controversy standard evinces a more expansive view of the public figure
doctrine than that embraced by the Supreme Court. 12 8
It is submitted, however, that the Third Circuit's more expansive
approach is nonetheless consistent with the underlying principles of
Gertz 129 while more adequately protecting the important first amend-
ment interests at stake. 130 The voluntariness requirement in Gertz rests
on the presumption that those who voluntarily involve themselves in
controversial societal affairs necessarily assume the risk that they may be
subject to media defamation. 131 It is submitted that those who volunta-
rily associate with controversial groups similarly assume the risk of false
statements concerning their involvement with the group.' 3 2 Thus it is
submitted that the Third Circuit approach, while providing greater pro-
tection for first amendment interests, remains consistent with prior
Supreme Court authority governing public figure determinations.
In conclusion, it is submitted that Marcone represents a tendency on
the part of the Third Circuit to apply a substantially more liberal version
of the public figure doctrine than that adopted by the United 'States
Supreme Court. 133 This tendency, with its expansive notion of the vol-
128. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. For example, it is submitted
that Frank Marcone would not have been a limited purpose public figure under
the rationale of Wolston. Marcone, like Ilya Wolston, was the subject of a govern-
mental investigation. See 754 F.2d at 1076; Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166-67. Addi-
tionally, neither man used his situation "as a fulcrum to create public discussion
about the methods being used in connection with an investigation or prosecu-
tion." See 754 F.2d at 1066; see also Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168. Moreover, both
men had either social (Marcone) or family (Wolston) ties to individuals involved
in the alleged controversy. See 754 F.2d at 1086; see also Wolston, 443 U.S. at 157.
For a discussion of the Third Circuit's attempt to distinguish Wolston, see supra
note 120 and accompanying text.
129. See 418 U.S. at 344-45 (reasoning that public figures assume the risk of
injury by defamatory statements). For a discussion of assumption of risk in this
context, see infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion of the first amendment interests, see supra notes 2-3
and accompanying text.
131. It is submitted that Frank Marcone can be deemed to have assumed
the risk that his highly publicized non-representational association with the no-
torious Pagan motorcycle gang and their connection to drug trafficking would
"invite attention and comment." See Rosanova, 411 F. Supp. at 445 (plaintiff's
association with organized crime was "bound to invite attention and comment").
132. It is suggested that in order to avoid a chilling effect on the reporting
of public controversies, the communication media must be able to operate
under the same assumption. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 ("the communications
media are entitled to act on the assumption that ... public figures have volunta-
rily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood
concerning them").
133. Compare Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985)
(plaintiff found to be public figure); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d
264 (3d Cir. 1980) (same); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1978) (same);
with Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (plaintiff
found not to be public figure); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)
23
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untariness requirement of Gertz will result in greater first amendment
protection for media defendants in the Third Circuit.' 3 4 The danger, of
course, is that legitimate reputational interests may be sacrificed. It is
submitted, however, that the Third Circuit has properly struck the bal-
ance between the individual and constitutional interests at stake.
Mark J Foley
(same); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (same); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (same).
134. It is submitted that the Third Circuit's approach, emphasizing as it
does the totality of the circumstances pertinent to the public figure determina-
tion, better protects the goal of" 'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' debate on
public issues." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270).
It permits the court to consider a wider variety of voluntary actions on the plain-
tiff's part with respect to the public controversy, thereby providing more protec-
tion to the media without completely sacrificing an individual's interest in
reputation. See generally Smolla, supra note 47 at 48-62 (arguing that the present
Supreme Court approach is too restrictive). For an example of the Third Cir-
cuit's continued willingness to protect first amendment interests by extending
actual malice protection to media defendants, see McDowell v. Paiewonski, 769
F.2d 942 (3d Cir. 1985) (plaintiff found to be limited purpose public figure).
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